U.S. Intragenerational Economic Mobility From 1984 to 2004: Trends and Implications by Gregory Acs & Seth Zimmerman
BY GREGORY ACS AND SETH ZIMMERMAN
U.S. INTRAGENERATIONAL
ECONOMIC MOBILITY
FROM 1984 TO 2004:
TRENDS AND IMPLICATIONS
All Economic Mobility Project materials are reviewed by members of the
Principals’ Group and guided with input of the project’s Advisory Board (see back cover).
The views expressed in this report represent those of the authors and not necessarily
of all individuals acknowledged above.
© October 2008
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This report is a product of the Economic Mobility Project
and authored by
Gregory Acs
and
Seth Zimmerman
Gregory Acs is a principal research associate in
the Urban Institute’s Income and Benefits Policy Center.
Seth Zimmerman, formerly a research associate in
the Urban Institute’s Income and Benefits Policy Center,
is currently a graduate student in economics at Yale University.
The authors would like to acknowledge the helpful comments
and suggestions of Austin Nichols, Gene Steuerle, and
Sheila Zedlewski of the Urban Institute, Isabel Sawhill of
the Brookings Institution, and Ianna Kachoris, John Morton,
and Scott Winship of the Economic Mobility Project
of the Pew Charitable Trusts.
Editorial assistance was provided by Ellen Wert and design expertise
by Carole Goodman of Freedom By Design. The authors also thank
all of the Economic Mobility Project principals and
advisory board members for many thoughtful discussions.
BY GREGORY ACS AND SETH ZIMMERMAN
U.S. INTRAGENERATIONAL
ECONOMIC MOBILITY
FROM 1984 TO 2004:
TRENDS AND IMPLICATIONS
MEASURING TRENDS IN MOBILITY: ISSUES AND METHODOLOGY
TRENDS IN INTRAGENERATIONAL MOBILITY
WHO IS IN THE BOTTOM QUINTILE?
FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTE TO ECONOMIC MOBILITY
DISCUSSION
ENDNOTES
RESOURCES
3
4
8
9
12
14
15C
O
N
T
E
N
T
S
By 2004, the richest 20 percent of households earned over half the total household
income in the United States, and their share of income continues to grow.1 Meanwhile,
the share of income earned by the poorest 20 percent of U.S. households stands at
3.4 percent of total household income, down 15 percent over two decades. Indeed,
despite strong economic growth during the mid- to late-1980s and again during
the mid- to late-1990s, income inequality by most every measure is higher today
than in 1984.2
High and rising income inequality engenders concerns about inequality in
opportunity—for example, lower-income households may not have access to the
same quality education or health care as higher-income households—and unequal
opportunities may exacerbate and perpetuate income inequality.
Income inequality, however, even rising inequality, is not inherently a problem.
Inequality in income to some extent reflects inequality in ability and effort; as
such, it is a central component of the reward and incentive structure that drives
economic growth. In addition, annual measurement has shown that the people at
the bottom of the income distribution in one year may be higher up the next year,
and people at the top may fall to the bottom. In no small part, economic mobility,
the rate at which individuals change positions in the income distribution over time,
mitigates inequality.
The crucial question is what has happened to economic mobility. Increasingly,
Americans feel that they cannot get ahead, and that it is even hard to keep up.3
A recent public opinion poll revealed that over half of all Americans believe they
have not moved forward, and nearly one-third say they have fallen back.
ECONOM IC MOB I L I T Y PROJECT : An Initiative of The Pew Charitable Trusts
2 U.S. Intragenerational Economic Mobility from 1984 to 2004: Trends and Implications
U.S. INTRAGENERATIONAL
ECONOMIC MOBILITY
FROM 1984 TO 2004:
TRENDS AND IMPLICATIONS
Further, only 41 percent say they are better off now than they were five years
ago—the lowest level in nearly 50 years. Meanwhile, the share of those saying they
are worse off than they were five years ago reached 31 percent, the highest it has
been in almost half a century.4
Clearly the steady drumbeat of bad economic news—from the housing crisis
to the credit crisis, from growing unemployment to the rapid rise in fuel and food
prices—has weighed heavily on the real and perceived well-being of Americans.
Yet the question remains: has it gotten harder for Americans to get ahead and
stay ahead?
To address that question, we examine trends in U.S. intragenerational income
mobility over the past two decades.5 Specifically, we focus on how the economic
positions of 25- to 44-year-olds change over a decade relative to one another, as
well as in absolute terms (whether they are doing better or worse at the end of
the decade than they were at the start). In addition, we compare intragenerational
mobility rates over two periods, 1984 to 1994 and 1994 to 2004.
We find that mobility rates have not changed very much between these two time
periods. This finding is somewhat surprising given the changes in the economy in the
1980s and 1990s, such as the ongoing shift from manufacturing to service-sector
jobs, rising immigrant populations, and extended periods of growth. Further, although
it is promising news that, at least through 2004, mobility rates had not fallen, stagnant
mobility rates may be a cause for concern in light of rising income inequality.
MEASURING TRENDS IN MOBILITY: ISSUES AND METHODOLOGY
Myriad measurement issues arise when assessing trends in mobility. These include
the income measure used, such as individual earnings, pre-tax income, post-tax income;
the population assessed (e.g., all individuals over age 16, 25- to 44-year-olds);
and the accounting period considered, such as mobility from one year to the next,
mobility over a decade, mobility based on multiple years of income, as well as the
specific years considered).
By and large, the implications of different measurement choices for the level of
and trend in mobility are consistent with expectations. Research that incorporates
individuals at the very beginning or very end of their careers tends to show higher
mobility rates than does research that focuses on prime-age workers. Research that
considers mobility from a single year to another single year finds more mobility
than does research that uses income averaged over several years.6
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Economic mobility can be measured either relative to one’s peer group or against
an absolute standard. Relative mobility measures how an individual’s economic
position changes over time relative to his or her peers. This involves ranking
individuals in a specific cohort (e.g., 25- to 44-year-olds) by income level (e.g.,
the poorest 20 percent, or bottom quintile, the next 20 percent, and so on) and
then assessing how these same individuals rank relative to one another at some
point in the future (say 10 years later when they are 35 to 54 years old). The
more people who have changed ranks (or income quintiles) relative to their peers,
the greater the level of relative income mobility.
One limitation of relative mobility is that it fails to capture the benefits of economic
growth. Even if an individual failed to improve relative to his or her peers over
time, that individual’s absolute level of well-being may have improved. For example,
when a cohort is relatively young, the poorest 20 percent of cohort members may
all have incomes below $20,000 a year, but as the cohort ages and the incomes of
all cohort members rise, the poorest 20 percent may have incomes up to $30,000.
A woman whose income rises from $16,000 to $24,000 would be in the bottom
quintile relative to her peers at both points in time (no relative mobility) even
though her income grew by 50 percent in absolute terms.
Absolute mobility can capture this growth by measuring mobility using the quintile
cutoffs established in a base year and assessing whether individuals’ income at
some later time moves them across the base-year income threshold. In the example
above, the individual would have moved out of the base-year bottom income
quintile because her income exceeded $20,000. Thus, absolute mobility captures
the effects of economic growth, but it does not indicate whether one’s position in
society has changed.
We measure the pre-tax, post-transfer family income of individuals age 25 to 44
and consider how their economic positions change relative to one another as well as
in absolute terms over two 10-year periods (1984–1994 and 1994–2004).7 Relying
on data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), we break the study
population into five equally sized income groups (quintiles) and compute the share
of the population that moves between quintiles over each 10-year period.8
TRENDS IN INTRAGENERATIONAL MOBILITY
The results of our analysis of mobility trends are easily summarized: Intragenerational
economic mobility rates have changed very little since the 1980s.
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Both relative and absolute mobility rates have remained stable over the past
two decades. We find that 60.4 percent of all 25- to 44-year-olds moved up or
down income quintiles relative to their peers between 1984 and 1994, and 60.5
percent did so between 1994 and 2004. Absolute mobility rates have also been
fairly stable over time. Between 1984 and 1994, 61.1 percent of individuals
experienced income changes that moved them across their 1984 income quintile
boundaries; between 1994 and 2004, absolute income mobility was 62.6 percent.
About half of individuals in the bottom income quintile move up to a higher
income quintile over a ten-year period, and there has been little change in
upward mobility over the past two decades. Figure 1 shows the economic
position that individuals in the bottom quintile in 1984 attained by 1994 relative
to their peers as well as the economic position that individuals in the bottom
quintile in 1994 attained by 2004. Note that there is little difference in upward
mobility rates out of the bottom quintile over the past two decades. About half
of the individuals in the bottom income quintile remained there 10 years later,
and about one-quarter moved up to the second quintile. About 10 percent were
able to move up to the middle income quintile, 7 percent to the fourth quintile,
and 4 percent reached the top quintile.
Figure 2 shows absolute upward mobility rates for those in the bottom income
quintile in 1984 and 1994, respectively. A little more than half of all individuals
in the bottom income quintile in 1984 experience sufficient income growth to lift
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FIGURE 1 Relative Mobility Out of the Bottom Income Quintile
Ending Quintile of Persons Who Were
in the Bottom Quintile 10 Years Earlier
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Note: Ending quintile thresholds are based on incomes at the end of the 10-year period, starting quintile thresholds
on incomes at the start of the 10-year period.
them above the 1984 bottom quintile threshold by 1994. There is no significant
difference in absolute upward mobility rates between the 1984–1994 and
1994–2004 periods.
Both absolute and relative mobility measures lead to the same general conclusion:
about half of those in the bottom income quintile can expect to rise out of it, and
economic mobility has not changed much in the past two decades.9
Downward mobility—the share of individuals falling into the bottom
quintile—has also remained fairly stable over time. As described in Figure 3,
about one in five of those who were in the second income quintile in 1984 fell into
the bottom income quintile relative to their peers by 1994; downward mobility from
the second quintile into the first is virtually identical from 1994 to 2004 as during
the 1984 to 1994 period. Downward relative mobility rates from the middle,
fourth, and top quintiles into the bottom quintile have not changed significantly
over time: between 11 and 15 percent fell from the middle quintile to the bottom,
6 percent fell from the fourth quintile to the bottom, and 3 percent fell from
the top quintile to the bottom.
Note that individuals with rising incomes can experience downward relative
mobility if their incomes do not grow as fast as those of their peers who had been
earning less than they did 10 years ago. For an individual to experience absolute
downward mobility, he or she must experience declines in real income.
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FIGURE 2 Absolute Mobility Out of the Bottom Income Quintile
Ending Quintile of Persons Who Were
in the Bottom Quintile 10 Years Earlier
1984–1994
1994–2004
Note: Starting and ending quintile thresholds are based on incomes at the start of the 10-year period,
adjusted for inflation.
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
P
er
ce
nt
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
Ending Quintile
47.2
45.9
21.7 22.8
11.8 13.2
9.4
10.8 9.9
7.3
Not surprisingly, downward absolute mobility rates are slightly lower than
downward relative mobility rates, as described in Figure 4. For example, absolute
downward mobility from the second quintile is about 14 percent as compared
with about 20 percent for relative downward mobility. For higher income quintiles,
absolute and relative downward mobility rates are more similar. Moreover, there
is little change in downward absolute mobility over time.
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FIGURE 3 Relative Mobility Into the Bottom Income Quintile
Starting Quintile of Persons Who Were
in the Bottom Quintile 10 Years Later
1984–1994
1994–2004
Note: Starting quintile thresholds are based on incomes at the start of the 10-year period,
ending income thresholds on incomes at the end of the 10-year period.
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FIGURE 4 Absolute Mobility Into the Bottom Income Quintile
Starting Quintile of Persons Who Were
in the Bottom Quintile 10 Years Later
1984–1994
1994–2004
Note: Starting and ending quintile thresholds are based on incomes at the start of the 10-year period,
adjusted for inflation.
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WHO IS IN THE BOTTOM QUINTILE?
That economic mobility rates in the United States have remained stable over
the past two decades may mask important changes in the composition of the
population and the factors that contribute to upward and downward mobility.
Table 1 shows that there are notable differences between individuals in the bottom
quintile and the population as a whole. They are less likely to be white, and they
are more likely to be women. They tend to be less educated, are less likely to own
homes, and are more likely to be disabled. Although they are more likely to live in
families with children, they are less likely to live with a spouse or partner. Finally,
they work fewer hours, on average, during the year than does the sample as a
whole. If they have a spouse or partner, that spouse or partner also works fewer
hours than do spouses and partners in the whole sample.
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TABLE 1 Bottom Quintile and Sample-Wide Characteristics
Cells in percentages, except where noted
a: Proportion/mean in bottom quintile of the 1984 sample significantly different from proportion/mean in bottom quintile
of the 1994 sample at the p=.10 level.
b: Proportion/mean in full 1984 sample significantly different from proportion/mean in full 1994 sample at the p=.10 level.
c: Proportion/mean in bottom quintile of the 1984 sample significantly different from proportion/mean in quintiles 2-5
of the 1984 sample at the p=.10 level.
d: Proportion/mean in bottom quintile of the 1994 sample significantly different from proportion/mean in quintiles 2-5
of the 1994 sample at the p=.10 level.
Bottom
Quintile
Full
Sample
White 71.3 62.4 86.5 81.5 a, b, c, d
Male 40.6 38.6 48.6 47.1 c, d
Less than high school (HS) education 33.2 22.3 13.3 8.2 a, b, c, d
HS education 43.6 48.6 39.6 38.0 c, d
More than HS education 23.2 29.1 47.1 53.8 a, b, c, d
Homeowner 43.6 32.3 65.0 62.4 a, c, d
Disabled 16.1 19.4 8.4 10.2 b, c, d
Children present 82.2 76.3 71.3 64.3 a, b, c, d
Spouse present 59.9 47.2 77.1 70.5 a, b, c, d
Other adult present 11.0 13.8 11.1 11.0 d
25–34 years old 59.3 48.1 55.4 45.9 a, b, c
Average work hours 1,309 1,287 1,722 1,773 b, c, d
Average spouse’s hours, if spouse present 1,359 1,368 1,630 1,765 b, c, d
Sample size 790 637 2,681 2,288
Characteristic Significance1984 1994 1984 1994
In addition, there have been important changes in the bottom quintile and the
population as a whole over time. The percent of whites in the bottom quintile
is falling, as is the share with children and with spouses present. The population
in the bottom quintile is also becoming older and more educated.
FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTE TO ECONOMIC MOBILITY
To better understand the factors that contribute to upward and downward mobility
and to see if the relative importance of different factors has changed over time, we
use a statistical technique called least-squares regression analysis.10 The analyses
consider the effects of race (white v. non-white),11 gender, age (25–34 v. 35–44),
education,12 presence of children, disability status, homeownership, spouse or
partner presence, work hours, spouse or partner work hours, presence of other
adults, and, in the case of downward mobility, starting income quintile. Figures 5
and 6 highlight the factors that are, statistically, significantly related to mobility
for at least one of the two time periods. These analyses focus on relative mobility
rather than absolute mobility; the latter findings are similar.13
Education—particularly schooling beyond high school—is a primary, consistent
driver of upward mobility. Race and gender as factors contributing to upward
mobility have diminished in importance over time while own work effort has
increased in importance. Education is extremely important. During 1984–1994
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FIGURE 5 Characteristics Associated With Leaving the Bottom Quintile
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* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Coefficients are based on a linear probability regression that includes these characteristics as well
as dummy variables for age, the presence of children, and the presence of other adults in the household. We measure own and spouse’s work
hours in thousand-hour units. We do not differentiate between spouses and permanent cohabiters, and interact the spouse hours variable
with a dummy variable for the spouse’s presence. Only characteristics with significant coefficients in at least one time period are shown.
Notes: (a) Relative to non-whites. (b) Relative to individuals who did not complete high school. (c) Effect of an additional 1,000 hours
of work per year.
40%
20%
0%
20%
White
(a)
Male >HS Ed.
(b)
Disability Home-
owner
Spouse
Present
Own
Hours
(c)
Spouse’s
Hours
(c)
HS Ed.
(b)
20.9***
8.2 10.2*
4.8
12.9**
6.0
32.9***31.4***
-19.2***
3.1
9.7*
6.6
-18.0***
0.8
4.8* 5.3*2.1
12.5***
and 1994–2004, the probability that an individual would leave the bottom
quintile was over 30 percentage points higher for those with more than a
high school education than for those who did not complete high school. That
said, getting a high school diploma rather than dropping out has become less
important to upward mobility.
Second, the independent impact of race on upward mobility appears to have
decreased over time. Between 1984 and 1994, the probability that a white
person would leave the bottom quintile was 21 percentage points higher than a
non-white’s chances of upward mobility. By the 1994–2004 period, the strength
of the relationship between upward mobility and race had substantially
diminished.14
Third, those who work more hours are more likely to move up and out of the bottom
quintile. Further, the relationship between work and upward mobility has grown
over time. An extra 1,000 hours of work increased the probability of leaving the
bottom quintile by nearly 5 percentage points between 1984 and 1994; between
1994 and 2004, an extra 1,000 hours increased the probability of upward mobility
by over 12 percentage points.
Finally, the relationships between upward mobility, marital status, and spousal
work are complex and have changed over time. Between 1984 and 1994, married
or partnered individuals in the bottom quintile whose spouse or partner did not
work were 18 percentage points less likely to be upwardly mobile than were
un-partnered individuals; however, for those with a spouse or partner, an
additional 1,000 hours of spouse or partner work increased upward mobility
by over 5 percentage points. Between 1994 and 2004, neither the presence
nor the work of spouses and partners was related to upward mobility.
Other than one’s original position in the income distribution, few factors
consistently predict downward mobility. Figure 6 shows that an individual’s
starting income quintile has a strong relationship to the probability of falling into
the bottom quintile. While this relationship held over both periods, the effects
of other factors that influence downward mobility have shifted over time. For
example, being white did not significantly reduce the chances of downward relative
mobility between 1984 and 1994, but it did between 1994 and 2004. Note,
however, that the magnitude of the difference is modest: 7.5 percentage points
in the later period compared with 5.3 percentage points in the early period.
ECONOM IC MOB I L I T Y PROJECT : An Initiative of The Pew Charitable Trusts
10 U.S. Intragenerational Economic Mobility from 1984 to 2004: Trends and Implications
Similarly, having a disability was not strongly related15 to downward relative
mobility between 1984 and 1994, but those with a disability were 14.1 percentage
points more likely to fall to the bottom quintile than those without a disability
between 1994 and 2004. And while men were more likely to fall to the bottom
than women during the early period, there were no significant gender differences
during the later period.
The number of hours an individual worked was unrelated to downward mobility
in both periods. Having a spouse or partner and that spouse or partner’s work
effort influenced downward mobility between 1984 and 1994 but not between
1994 and 2004. In the earlier period, those with spouses or partners were less
likely to move down to the bottom quintile than those without, but the more that
spouse or partner worked, the higher the odds of downward mobility. This may
seem surprising, but it is consistent with the idea that if a working spouse or
partner is what is keeping a person out of the bottom quintile at the beginning
of the period, then a reduction of the spouse or partner’s hours of work could
drop that person down to the bottom by the end—hence those with working
spouses and partners are at elevated risk for downward mobility. Again, this
only holds for the 1984–1994 period.
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FIGURE 6 Characteristics Associated With Entering the Bottom Quintile
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* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Coefficients are based on a linear probability regression that includes these characteristics as well as
dummy variables for age, education, the presence of children, and own work hours. We measure own and spouse’s work hours in thousand-hour
units. We do not differentiate between spouses and permanent cohabiters, and interact the spouse hours variable with a dummy variable for the
spouse’s presence. Only characteristics with significant coefficients in at least one time period are shown.
Notes: (a) Relative to non-whites. (b) Effect of an additional 1,000 hours of spouse’s work per year. (c) Relative to being in the second quintile.
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DISCUSSION
Using data from the PSID, we find that intragenerational mobility between 1994
and 2004 among a cohort of adults ages 25 to 44 in 1994 is quite comparable
to the economic mobility experienced by an earlier cohort from 1984 to 1994.
In other words, we find very little difference in overall mobility over time. This
finding is striking in light of the many notable changes in the economy over the
past few decades such as the ongoing shift from manufacturing to service sector
jobs, rising immigrant populations, and increases in female labor force
participation.
When we examine the characteristics associated with both upward and downward
mobility, we find that whites, men, those with more education, and those who own
homes are more likely to exit the bottom income quintile than are other individuals;
however, the effects of race and educational differences on upward mobility appear
to have diminished over time. The factors associated with increased downward
mobility are being non-white and having a disability. Over time, the importance
of these characteristics in contributing to downward mobility has increased.
Some may point to the levels of mobility in the economy and suggest that they
should assuage concerns about growing income inequality and the longer-term
social stratification and unequal opportunity that it may imply. However, short-
and long-term inequality and mobility interact in complex ways (for a discussion
of how they relate to one another, see Box 1). It is important to note that in the
context of rising income inequality, stable mobility rates suggest that the distribution
of lifetime income must be growing more unequal. That is, lifetime or long-term
economic inequality is rising.
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BOX 1 THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN SHORT-TERM INEQUALITY,
LONG-TERM INEQUALITY, AND ECONOMIC MOBILITY
A. Definitions. Short-term inequality describes
inequality in the distribution of income received over
a short period of time, usually a year. Long-term
inequality describes inequality in the distribution of
income received over several years or even a lifetime.
Mobility is the rate at which individuals change
positions in the income distribution over time.
B. Long-term inequality in the context of
stable short-term inequality and stable mobility.
To understand the relationship between short- and
long-term inequality and mobility, consider this
simple example.
There are only two types of people, the “have-nots,”
whose jobs pay $20,000 a year, and the “haves,”
whose jobs pay $40,000 a year. The population is
equally divided in any given year, but from year
to year, 20 percent of workers change types. In any
one year, the “haves” have twice as much income
as the “have-nots.”
But over a longer period (say, two years), 20 percent
of the “haves” will have been “have-nots” for part
of the time. Thus the average annual income for
the “haves” is $38,000 over two years; for the
“have-nots” it is $22,000. As a result, the “haves”
have about 75 percent more income than the “have-
nots” when inequality is measured over the longer
term, illustrating that mobility reduces long-term
inequality relative to inequality in a single year.
C. Long-term inequality in the context of increasing
short-term inequality and stable mobility. Using
the same example, consider what happens if short-
term inequality increases. In year two, the “haves”
now earn $50,000 a year and the “have-nots” earn
$10,000. Keeping mobility constant at 20 percent
for both groups, we find that average annual income
for the “haves” is $43,000; for the “have-nots” it is
$17,000. As a result, the “haves” have about 2.5
times the average annual income of the “have-nots.”
Thus, the increase in short-term inequality results
in an increase in long-term inequality even with
constant mobility. While mobility does reduce
long-term inequality relative to inequality measured
in a single year, increases in single year inequality
imply increases in long-term inequality even if
mobility rates remain constant. In fact, mobility
rates have to rise to offset the long-term effects
of rising short-term inequality.16
D. Implications of rising short-term inequality
for mobility. Rising short-term inequality does not
necessarily have any effect on mobility. Some might
assert that if the “rungs of the ladder” are moving
farther apart, mobility must be falling, but it really
depends on why inequality is increasing (and in a
narrower, technical sense, how inequality and
mobility are measured). For example, imagine that
the “haves” in our example have high technology
jobs and the “have-nots” have manual labor jobs,
but the sorting across jobs is random. If technological
change causes tech jobs to be even higher paying
and manual jobs to be even lower paying, income
inequality will increase; but the chance that a
laborer will land a tech job and that a tech worker
will fall into a manual labor job remains constant.
Of course, if the “have-nots” lack the skills
necessary to shift into the now more demanding
tech jobs held by the “haves,” then mobility rates
could drop along with rising inequality. The
important point is that rising inequality does
not necessarily imply a change in mobility.
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and end year, and we exclude individuals with family incomes under $1,200 in 2005 dollars
or in the top 1 percent in either the base or end year. For details about the PSID and sample
construction, see Acs and Zimmerman (2008).
9 That mobility has remained fairly constant from decade to decade is consistent with findings
made by other researchers. For a comparison of research findings on mobility, see Acs and
Zimmerman (2008).
10 For a full description of the regression model, see Acs and Zimmerman (2008).
11 Because there are few Hispanics in the original PSID sample, we can only reliably
distinguish between whites and non-whites.
12 We use three education categories: less than high school, high school degree, and schooling
beyond high school. We do not distinguish between those who have attended some college,
those who have a college degree, and those who have graduate/advanced degrees. This allows
for a more parsimonious specification of the model and a focus on the value of a high school
degree.
13 For a regression analysis of absolute mobility, see Acs and Zimmerman (2008).
14 The statistical significance diminished as well. Because Latinos added to the PSID in 1990
and the 1997 immigrant subsample is excluded from the analysis, the reference category is
largely composed of blacks. Note that the bottom income quintile has become less “white”
over time. As such, the declining significance of race/ethnicity for upward mobility may in
part reflect unobserved differences in the characteristics of whites and non-whites who are in
the bottom quintile of the income distribution.
15 Technically speaking, the difference was not statistically significant.
16 For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see Gottschalk and Danziger (1998).
ECONOM IC MOB I L I T Y PROJECT : An Initiative of The Pew Charitable Trusts
14 U.S. Intragenerational Economic Mobility from 1984 to 2004: Trends and Implications
ECONOM IC MOB I L I T Y PROJECT : An Initiative of The Pew Charitable Trusts
U.S. Intragenerational Economic Mobility from 1984 to 2004: Trends and Implications15
RESOURCES
Acs, Gregory and Seth Zimmerman. 2008. “Like Watching Grass Grow? Assessing Changes
in U.S. Economic Mobility over the Past Two Decades.” Washington, DC: The Urban
Institute and The Economic Mobility Project.
Auten, Gerald E., and Geoffrey Gee. 2007. “Income Mobility in the U.S.: Evidence from
Income Tax Returns for 1987 and 1996.” OTA Working Paper 98, U.S. Treasury, May 2007.
Bradbury, Katharine, and Jane Katz. 2002. “Women’s Labor Market Involvement and Family
Income Mobility When Marriages End.” New England Economic Review. 2002(Q4): 41-74.
Bania, Neil and Laura Leete. 2007. “Income Volatility and Food Insufficiency in U.S. Low-
Income Households, 1992-2003,” Institute for Research on Poverty Discussion Paper #125-07.
Madison, WI: Institute for Research on Poverty.
Batchelder, Lily. 2003. “Taxing the Poor: Income Averaging Reconsidered,” Harvard Journal
on Legislation. 40(2): 395-452.
Caroll, Robert, David Joulfaian, and Mark Rider. 2006. “Income Mobility: The Recent
American Experience.” International Studies Program Working Paper 06-20, Andrew Young
School of Policy Studies July 2006.
Cox, W. Michael, and Richard Alm. 1996. “By Our Own Bootstraps: Economic Opportunity
and the Dynamics of Income Distribution.” Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Annual Report
1995.
Duncan, Greg, Timothy Smeeding, and Willard Rodgers. 1991. “W(h)ither the Middle Class?
A Dynamic View.” The Jerome Levy Economics Institute of Bard College Working Paper No. 56.
Dynan, Karen E., Douglas W. Elmendorf, and Daniel E. Sichel. 2007. “The Evolution of
Household Income Volatility.” Unpublished paper, Federal Reserve Board and Brookings
Institution.
Fletcher, Michael A. 2008. “Can’t Get Ahead, Hard to Keep Up; A New Poll Finds Americans
Feeling a Lot More Squeezed.” Washington Post, April 10, 2008, p. D01.
Gosselin, Peter G. & Seth Zimmerman. 2007. “Trends in Income Volatility and Risk,
1970-2004.” Paper presented at the 2007 Association for Public Policy and Management
Annual meeting in Washington, DC..
Gottschalk, Peter and Sheldon Danziger. 1998. “Family Income Mobility: How Much is There
and Has It Changed?” In J. Auerbach and R. Belous, eds. The Inequality Paradox. (pp. 92–111)
Washington, D.C.: National Policy Association.
Gottschalk, Peter and Robert A. Moffitt. 2006. “Trends in Earnings Volatility in the U.S.:
1970-2002. Paper presented at the 2007 Annual American Economic Association Meetings,
Chicago, IL.
Gottschalk, Peter and Robert A. Moffitt. 2002. “Trends in the Transitory Variance of Earnings
in the United States.” The Economic Journal. 112(478): C68-C-73.
Gottschalk, Peter and Robert A. Moffitt. 1995. “Trends in the Covariance Structure
of Earnings in the U.S.” Boston College Working Papers in Economics. Boston College
Department of Economics.
ECONOM IC MOB I L I T Y PROJECT : An Initiative of The Pew Charitable Trusts
16 U.S. Intragenerational Economic Mobility from 1984 to 2004: Trends and Implications
Gottschalk, Peter and Robert A. Moffitt. 1994. “The Growth of Earnings Instability in the
U.S. Labor Market,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. 25(2): 217-272.
Hacker, Jacob S. 2006. The Great Risk Shift. Oxford University Press: New York.
Haider, Steven J. 2001. “Earnings Instability and Earnings Inequality of Males in the United
States: 1967-1991.” Journal of Labor Economics. 19(4): 799-836.
Hungerford, Thomas. 2008. “Income Inequality, Income Mobility, and Economic Policy: U.S.
Trends in the 1980s and 1990s.” Congressional Research Service Report RL34434.
Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service.
Sawhill, Isabel V., and Mark Condon. 1992. “Is U.S. Income Inequality Really Growing?:
Sorting Out the Fairness Question.” Policy Bites. Washington, DC: Urban Institute.
Isaacs, Julia B., Isabel V. Sawhill, and Ron Haskins. 2008. Getting Ahead or Losing Ground:
Economic Mobility in America. Washington, DC: Economic Mobility Project, an Initiative of
The Pew Charitable Trusts.
http://www.economicmobility.org/assets/pdfs/Economic_Mobility_in_America_Full.pdf.
Mazumder, Bhashkar. 2008. Upward Intergenerational Economic Mobility in the United
States. Washington, D.C.: Economic Mobility Project, an Initiative of The Pew Charitable
Trusts. http://www.economicmobility.org/assets/pdfs/EMP_Upward_Mobility.pdf.
Taylor, Paul, Rich Morin, D’Vera Cohn, Richard Fry, Rakesh Kochhar, and April Clark. 2008.
Inside the Middle Class: Bad Times Hit the Good Life. Washington, DC: Pew Research Center.
http://pewsocialtrends.org/assets/pdf/MC-Middle-class-report.pdf.
U.S. Department of the Treasury. 2008. Income Mobility in the U.S. from 1996 to 2005.
http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/hp673.htm [last accessed 3/14/08].

A B O U T T H E P R O J E C T
The Economic Mobility Project is a unique nonpartisan collaborative effort of The Pew
Charitable Trusts that seeks to focus attention and debate on the question of economic
mobility and the health of the American Dream. It is led by Pew staff and a Principals
Group of individuals from four leading policy institutes—The American Enterprise
Institute, The Brookings Institution, The Heritage Foundation and The Urban Institute.
As individuals, each principal may or may not agree with potential policy solutions or
prescriptions for action but all believe that economic mobility plays a central role in
defining the American experience and that more attention must be paid to understanding
the status of U.S. economic mobility today.
P R O J E C T P R I N C I P A L S
Marvin Kosters, Ph.D., American Enterprise Institute
Isabel Sawhill, Ph.D., Center on Children and Families, The Brookings Institution
Ron Haskins, Ph.D., Center on Children and Families, The Brookings Institution
Stuart Butler, Ph.D., Domestic and Economic Policy Studies, The Heritage Foundation
William Beach, Center for Data Analysis, The Heritage Foundation
Eugene Steuerle, Ph.D., Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center, The Urban Institute
Sheila Zedlewski, Income and Benefits Policy Center, The Urban Institute
P R O J E C T A D V I S O R S
David Ellwood, Ph.D., John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University
Christopher Jencks, M. Ed., John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University
Sara McLanahan, Ph.D., Princeton University
Bhashkar Mazumder, Ph.D., Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Ronald Mincy, Ph.D., Columbia University School of Social Work
Timothy M. Smeeding, Ph.D., Maxwell School, Syracuse University
Gary Solon, Ph.D., Michigan State University
Eric Wanner, Ph.D., The Russell Sage Foundation
The Pew Charitable Trusts
(www.pewtrusts.org) is
driven by the power of
knowledge to solve today’s
most challenging problems.
Pew applies a rigorous,
analytical approach to
improve public policy,
inform the public and
stimulate civic life. We
partner with a diverse
range of donors, public
and private organizations
and concerned citizens who
share our commitment to
fact-based solutions and
goal-driven investments
to improve society.
